Mandatory Adoption Of IFRS  And Earnings Transparency In Korea by Shin, Hoyoung & Oh, Hyunmin
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2017 Volume 33, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1129 The Clute Institute 
Mandatory Adoption Of IFRS  
And Earnings Transparency In Korea 
Hoyoung Shin, Hanyang University, South Korea 
Hyunmin Oh, Hanyang University, South Korea 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate the relation between mandatory adoption of IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) and 
earnings transparency in Korea. We define transparency of earnings as how well it explains a firm value. Financial 
reporting mitigates information risks of the firm by lessening information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders 
of a firm. If accounting information produced after adopting IFRS better explains a firm value, then, it will reduce 
information asymmetry and information risks of the firm, resulting in enhancement of earnings transparency. We 
measure earnings transparency based on Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman et al. (2013) and Cheng and 
Subramanyam (2008).   
 
The sample is 2,276 which are listed on Korea stock exchange over 2008-2014. The empirical result shows adopting 
IFRS is significantly positive with earnings transparency, which means it mitigates information asymmetry, enhancing 
earnings transparency in Korea.  
 
Our study is distinguished from prior studies because we empirically examine influence of adopting IFRS on earnings 
transparency of Korea. Our result implies adopting IFRS contributes to higher earnings transparency which helps 
market participants make decisions.  
 
Keywords: Earnings Transparency; IFRS; Information Risk; Information Asymmetry  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n Korea, since the foreign exchange crisis in the late 1990s, the issue of accounting transparency has 
become important for firms in order to attract foreign capital and mitigate the ‘Korea discount’. Even 
though the government has made considerable efforts in strengthening disclosure requirements and 
encouraging changes in corporate governance, accounting transparency of firms is still an issue.1 Thus, it is yet 
important to empirically test whether adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) enhances earnings 
transparency in Korea. Korean listed firms must follow IFRS to prepare consolidated financial statements starting 
from 2011.  
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that widespread adoption of IFRS could lead to more accurate, comprehensive, and 
timely information and greater comparability of financial statements across countries. However, there are doubts about 
benefits of IFRS adoption. Since IFRS allow many alternatives in preparing and disclosing financial statements and 
are principle-based, managerial discretion might increase, deteriorating quality of earnings. There are also concerns 
on extremely high costs for implementations of and compliance with IFRS. 
 
Prior research documents that adoption of IFRS improves the quality of accounting information in Korea (Lee, Jin & 
Lee, 2015; Jang, In, Lee, Seo & Cheung, 2016).2 Lee et al. (2015) find that explanatory powers of earnings and equity 
																																								 																				
1 The Financial Services Commission found accounting fraud and ordered Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. to rewrite its incorrect 
financial statements from 2008 to the first quarter of 2016. An accounting firm was suspended conducting new audits for one year as punishment. 
In 2016, International Institute for Management Development (IMD) of Switzerland ranked Korea as the lowest among 61 countries surveyed in 
the accounting transparency category. 
2 Financial reporting quality is one of the key determinants of analyst forecast accuracy (Bradshaw, Richardsom & Sloan, 2001; Jeong & Lim, 
2005; Cho & Jo, 2009; Kang, Lee & Lee, 2013). 
I 
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book value have increased from pre-IFRS periods to post-IFRS periods and value relevance improved after IFRS 
adoption. However, Choi (2013) and Choi, Park & Choi (2013) fail to find any significant differences in value 
relevance after IFRS adoption. The limitation of these studies is that they use the samples obtained from only one or 
two years after the adoption of IFRS. We use longer periods to better observe potential changes in earnings 
transparency from pre-IFRS to post-IFRS periods.  
 
If accounting information after adopting IFRS better explains a firm value, it will increase information usefulness and 
contribute to an efficient allocation of economic resources. We use earnings transparency as a surrogate for accounting 
transparency and test whether mandatorily adopting IFRS improves earnings transparency of Korea. 
 
Earnings transparency is measured based on Barth et al. (2013) and Cheng and Subramanyam (2008). We define 
earnings transparency as how well it explains a firm value. Transparent firms may better describe the economic value 
of a firm. We develop a measure equal to the explanatory power of the returns-earnings relation in which earnings and 
change in earnings move contemporaneously with stock returns.  
 
Using a sample of 2,276 from the Korea Stock Exchange during 2008 - 2014, we find adopting IFRS is significantly 
positive with transparency of earnings. Our results imply adopting IFRS contributes to higher level of earnings 
transparency and helps market participants make decisions. 
 
Our paper directly tests the relation between the full adoption of IFRS and earnings transparency of firms in Korea by 
using longer sample periods to enhance our understanding of the economic consequences of accounting numbers. It 
complements prior research by examining the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on earnings transparency, in 
particular using earnings transparency measures developed by Barth et al. (2013) and Cheng and Subramanyam 
(2008).3 Another evidence will be accumulated to enhance our understanding of the Korean financial market and 
reporting system.  
 
After an introduction, 2 reviews prior literature and develops hypothesis. 3 presents research method. 4 reports results. 
Finally, 5 explains the conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to a recent survey, general accounting works of Korean companies increased significantly and accounting 
personnel reinforced since the adoption of IFRS and discretionary judgement and outside inquiry or consulting for 
accounting issues increased significantly, reflecting the difficulties faced by firms that were used to rule-based 
accounting standards rather than principle-based (Han & Lee, 2017). Accordingly, adoption of IFRS may not enhance 
comparability across firms or comparability across years within the same firm as expected.  
 
Prior studies report that managerial discretion increased and consequently, earnings quality deteriorated further 
(Capkun, Jeny, Jeanjean & Weiss, 2011; Ahmed, Neel & Wang, 2013). However, Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) 
and Yip and Young (2012) report that financial reporting quality and analysts' forecasts have improved after adopting 
IFRS. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document that information asymmetry decreased after the adoption of IFRS. Daske, 
Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find that the adoption of IFRS reduces the cost of equity as the market liquidity increases.4 
In Korea, adoption of IFRS improves the quality of accounting information (Jang et al. 2016). However, most of these 
studies use a short period of time to examine the impact of IFRS on accounting information quality. 
 
There are mixed results about the effect of IFRS adoption on value relevance. The impact of IFRS adoption on value 
relevance in the United Kingdom and EU is positive (Horton et al. 2010; Barth et al. 2008) while value relevance of 
both earnings and book value has decreased in Spain and Italy (Lee et al. 2015). Arising in the transition from previous 
accounting standards to IFRS, the adjustments to net income provide incremental value-relevance, but the adjustments 
to net assets do not have any incremental effect (Kim, Choi, Kim & Kim, 2014) or actually decrease value-relevance 
																																								 																				
3 Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) uses the methodology developed by Gu (2002). 
4 Barth et al. (2013) provide evidence that transparent firms enjoy lowered financing costs. Shin and Park (2014) show that financial statement 
comparability reduces differences of opinion among investors in Korea, which helps reduce ‘Korea Discount’ phenomenon. 
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(Choi et al. 2013; Kim & Kim, 2015). The optimistic bias in analyst recommendations has increased after the adoption 
of IFRS (Yoon & Mo, 2016). Since results of prior research are not conclusive, we need to continue to test the effect 
of adoption of IFRS on accounting information quality to improve our understanding of accounting numbers. Using 
earnings transparency as a surrogate for accounting information quality as well as accounting transparency, we expect 
that adopting IFRS reduce information asymmetry and be positively associated with earnings transparency in Korea. 
Thus, following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis: Mandatorily adopting IFRS enhances earnings transparency in Korea.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
To test the hypothesis, we use the following model (1) 
 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆&' = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽-𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆&'	 + 𝛽0𝐴𝑄&' + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸&' + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉&' + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀&' + 𝛽=𝐴𝐺𝐸&' + 𝛽?𝐺𝑅𝑊&' +𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅&' + 𝛽B𝑂𝑊𝑁&' + 𝛽-+𝐵𝐼𝐺4&' + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀&'	 (1) 
 
Here, i and t indicate firm i and year t. where, 
 
TRANS1 : earnings transparency measured by Barth et al. (2013); 
TRANS2 : earnings transparency measured by Cheng and Subramanyam (2008); 
IFRS : IFRS dummy variable, 1 if the period is 2012, 2013, 2014, and zero otherwise; 
AQ : absolute value of residual by Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1995) multiplied by (-1); 
SIZE : natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV : long-term debt/ total assets; 
LOSSDUM : value of 1 if losses; 
AGE : natural logarithm of the listed period; 
GRW : growth rate of total assets, measured by (total assets minus lagged assets) / lagged assets; 
FOR : foreign ownership;  
OWN : major ownership; 
BIG4 : value of 1 if audited by Big 4 auditors; 
YD : year dummies; 
ID : industry dummies; 𝜀&' : residuals, the estimated error in the model.  
 
The dependent variable, TRANS, is the earnings transparency, which is based on measures of Barth et al. (2013) and 
Cheng and Subramanyam (2008). The independent variable is IFRS, one if the period is 2012, 2013, 2014, and zero 
otherwise. If IFRS improves earnings transparency, we expect a coefficient on IFRS to be 	𝛽- > 0.  
 
Based on Barth et al. (2013), we measure our earnings transparency as follows:5 
 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆1&,' = 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐼I,'+𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑁J,' (2) 
 
To calculate 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐼I,', we estimate Eq. (3): 
 𝑅𝐸𝑇&,I,' = 𝛼+L + 𝛼-L𝐸&,I,'/𝑃&,I,'O- + 	𝛼0L∆𝐸&,I,'/𝑃&,I,'O- + 𝜀&,I,' (3) 
 
To calculate 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑁J,', we estimate Eq. (4): 
 
																																								 																				
5	In this study, we use variables of Barth et al. (2013). However, instead of measuring earnings transparency by using 108 regression analyses as in 
Barth et al. (2013), we estimate it by using an industry-year cross-sectional method for the total sample.  
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𝑅𝐸𝑇&,J,' = 𝛼+LQ + 𝛼-LQ𝐸&,J,'/𝑃&,J,'O- + 	𝛼0LQ∆𝐸&,J,'/𝑃&,J,'O- + 𝜀&,J,' (4) 
 
RET : annual returns from beginning three months after fiscal year end; 
E : earnings; 
P : the previous year-end price; 
△E : change in earnings. 
 
Eq. (2) expresses TRANS1i,t earnings transparency measure, as sum of two measures, TRANSIj,t and TRANSINp,t. 
TRANSIj,t is the sum of 𝑅0 s from regressions on returns and earnings estimated by industry in equation (3). 
TRANSINp,t is the sum of 𝑅0𝑠	from regressions estimated by portfolio in equation (4). In estimating TRANSINp,t 
observations from each industry-year regression in equation (3) are placed into one of four portfolios based on 
residuals from annual regressions for that industry. The portfolio regression reflects differences in returns-earnings 
relations not measured fully by industry estimation. Portfolios are industry neutral because of same industry 
composition. 
 
EPSt/Pt-1 and △Et/Pt-1 are deflated by beginning of year price. Earnings transparency is measured by the explanatory 
power of returns-earnings relation. More transparent firms are those whose earnings better explain the economic value 
of a firm. Higher explanatory power in returns-earnings regressions indicates greater earnings transparency.  
 
  Based on Cheng and Subramanyam (2008), we measure our earnings transparency as follows: 
 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇&' = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽-𝑁𝐼&'	 + 𝛽0𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆&' + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼&'×𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆&' + 𝛽5∆𝑁𝐼&'	 + 𝜀&' (5) 
 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆2&' = 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇&' 	− 		𝛽+ + 		β-𝑁𝐼&' + 		β0𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆&' + 		β2𝑁𝐼&'×𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆&' + 		β5∆𝑁𝐼&' 0	 (6) 
 
ARETit : market adjusted return over the fiscal year; 
LOSSit : one if negative income, zero otherwise; 
NIit : net income/ beginning market value of equity; ∆NIit : change in net income/ beginning market value of equity 
 
The stock returns are measured by applying the regression coefficients measured by the industry-year regressions in 
equation (5). The earnings transparency is measured by the difference between stock returns and market adjusted 
returns. To measure the magnitude of this difference, we square the values obtained by subtracting the stock returns 
from the market adjusted returns as shown in equation (6). In order to have a property whose value increases as the 
earnings transparency increases, we multiply the squared residuals in equation (6) by negative one (-1).  
 
Based on previous research, we use control variables. To control information environment, we use natural log of total 
assets (SIZE) (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). Total assets minus lagged assets deflated by lagged assets, GRW is included 
to control a firm's growth. To control information uncertainty, solvency, and negative income, auditor quality, and 
earnings management, we include AGE, LEV, LOSS, FOR, OWN, BIG4 and AQ. If the debt ratio (LEV) is high, 
firms will be reluctant to disclose information. As the debt ratio affects the information asymmetry, it is added as a 
control variable (Cho & Jo, 2010; Oh & Shin, 2016). Debt ratio predict a positive relationship with information. Firms 
with a negative income (LOSSDUM) and a high growth rate (GRW) have large uncertainties in the market, so they 
predict a negative relationship with earnings transparency. Firms with long AGE predict a positive relationship with 
earnings transparency because the information environment is abundant in the market. Accruals quality (AQ) predicts 
a negative relationship with earnings transparency because it is expected that earnings transparency lowers earnings 
management. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
In Table 1, we first eliminate the quoted non-financial December firms. Those whose data cannot be collected from 
the Kis-Value and FN-Guide are deleted. Final sample for the model is 2,276 firm-year observations from the Korea 
Stock Exchange from 2008 till 2014. To avoid the dilution of the regression result, we delete those which mandatorily 
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adopted IFRS in 2011 and those which voluntarily adopted K-IFRS before 2011. We winsorize at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  
 
 
Table 1. Sample 
Criteria Observations 
Quoted non-financial December 31 firms for years 2008-2014 4,306 
(less) Those mandatorily adopt IFRS in 2011 (623) 
(less) Financial and stock data cannot collect from Kis-Value and FN-Guide (1,252) 
(less) Firms voluntarily adopt IFRS before 20116 (155) 
Total 2,276 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution 
Panel A: Distribution by year 
Year Number  % 
2008 306 13.44 
2009 316 13.88 
2010 330 14.50 
2012 430 18.89 
2013 443 19.46 
2014 451 19.82 
Total 2,276 100 
 
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
Industry Number % 
Food & beverages 156 6.85 
Textile & leather products 125 5.49 
Woods & pulp products  66 2.90 
Chemicals &chemical products  234 10.28 
Medical & manufacturing 76 3.34 
Metallic 169 7.43 
Pc & medical 150 6.59 
Machine & electronic  173 7.60 
Motor vehicles & other transport equipment products 201 8.83 
Construction 132 5.80 
Wholesale & retail trade 217 9.53 
Transportation 76 3.34 
Publishing & broadcating 54 2.37 
Professional Services 312 13.71 
Other 135 5.93 
Total 2,276 100.00 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In PANEL A of Table 3, mean (median) of TRANS1 is 0.380 (0.383), indicating an average 38% of earnings 
transparency of companies. The mean (median) of TRANS2 is -0.253 (-0.044). The mean (median) of IFRS is 0.582 
(1.0), implying that 58.2% adopt IFRS mandatorily after the IFRS adoption year of 2011. Most other control variables 
are normally distributed. PANEL B of Table 3 presents the annual change values of TRANS1, TRANSI, TRANSIN, 
and TRANS2.  
																																								 																				
6 In this study, the KOSPI listed non-financial December 31 firms were selected as a sample. Among them, 7 firms were introduced early in 2009 
and 24 firms were introduced early in 2010. A total of 31 firms were introduced early. Of the 186 firm-year observations of six years, 31 firms with 
no financial data were excluded, and the remaining 155 samples were additionally removed. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2017 Volume 33, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1134 The Clute Institute 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N=2,276) 
Panel A. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
TRANS1 0.380 0.213 -0.026 0.228 0.383 0.521 0.883 
TRANS2 -0.253 0.599 -2.412 -0.146 -0.044 -0.009 0.000 
IFRS 0.582 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AQ -0.051 0.056 -0.305 -0.068 -0.032 -0.013 0.000 
SIZE 27.266 1.587 24.334 26.123 26.996 28.217 31.767 
LEV 0.507 0.194 0.113 0.363 0.525 0.644 0.965 
LOSSDUM 0.239 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AGE 2.810 0.861 0.000 2.398 3.045 3.526 4.078 
GRW 0.137 0.748 -0.966 -0.020 0.048 0.150 8.977 
FOR 0.109 0.140 0.000 0.010 0.050 0.156 0.897 
OWN 0.431 0.166 0.020 0.313 0.427 0.539 0.900 
BIG4 0.690 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B. 
Year n Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
2008 306 
∆TRANS1 0.100 0.194 -0.470 -0.040 0.084 0.213 0.648 ∆TRANSI 0.056 0.207 -0.506 -0.068 0.051 0.198 0.696 ∆TRANSIN 0.153 0.110 -0.314 0.085 0.156 0.229 0.367 ∆TRANS2 0.291 0.746 -2.396 -0.004 0.039 0.173 2.412 
2009 316 
∆TRANS1 0.122 0.025 -0.805 -0.036 0.133 0.309 0.648 ∆TRANSI 0.094 0.261 -0.769 -0.116 0.194 0.285 0.613 ∆TRANSIN 0.090 0.163 -0.277 -0.046 0.109 0.172 0.498 ∆TRANS2 0.007 0.660 -2.936 -0.133 -0.027 0.014 2.411 
2010 330 
∆TRANS1 -0.051 0.270 -0.608 -0.264 -0.034 0.102 0.648 ∆TRANSI -0.059 0.227 -0.500 -0.207 0.060 0.127 0.417 ∆TRANSIN -0.008 0.153 -0.278 -0.139 -0.035 0.109 0.359 ∆TRANS2 0.088 0.621 -2.887 -0.053 0.006 0.097 2.412 
2012 430 
∆TRANS1 0.233 0.204 -0.543 0.116 0.268 0.361 0.648 ∆TRANSI 0.027 0.183 -0.387 -0.090 0.017 0.140 0.405 ∆TRANSIN 0.051 0.151 -0.361 -0.064 0.052 0.137 0.443 ∆TRANS2 0.094 0.670 -3.678 -0.056 0.004 0.097 2.410 
2013 443 
∆TRANS1 -0.050 0.228 -0.619 -0.223 -0.052 0.093 0.648 ∆TRANSI -0.047 0.179 -0.335 -0.234 0.002 0.072 0.294 ∆TRANSIN -0.003 0.145 -0.259 -0.088 0.019 0.102 0.334 ∆TRANS2 0.093 0.598 -3.893 -0.042 0.003 0.089 2.412 
2014 451 
∆TRANS1 -0.240 0.226 -0.835 -0.411 -0.257 -0.065 0.351 ∆TRANSI -0.044 0.200 -0.508 -0.178 -0.001 0.071 0.374 ∆TRANSIN -0.217 0.108 -0.389 -0.320 -0.218 -0.119 0.045 ∆TRANS2 -0.057 0.664 -3.716 -0.125 -0.016 0.043 2.412 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
TRANS1 : earnings transparency measured by Barth et al. (2013); 
TRANS2 : earnings transparency measured by Cheng and Subramanyam (2008); 
IFRS : 1 if the period is 2012, 2013, 2014, and zero otherwise; 
AQ : absolute value of residual by Dechow et al. (1995) multiplied by (-1); 
SIZE : natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV : long-term debt/ total assets; 
LOSSDUM : value of 1 if losses; 
AGE : natural logarithm of the listed period; 
GRW : growth rate of total assets, measured by (total assets minus lagged assets) / lagged assets; 
FOR : foreign ownership;  
OWN : major ownership; 
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BIG4 : value of 1 if audited by Big 4 auditors; ∆TRANS1 : trans1 minus lagged trans1; ∆TRANSI : transi minus lagged transi; ∆TRANSIN : transin minus lagged transin; ∆TRANS2 : trans2 minus lagged trans2. 
 
4.2 Correlation  
 
In Table 4, TRANS2 only positively correlates with IFRS adoption, which implies adopting IFRS enhances earnings 
transparency. Regarding control variables, TRANS1 and TRANS2 are positively correlated with AQ, SIZE, and AGE 
as expected. However, correlation test does not consider control variables. Thus, we neeed to perform the regression 
analysis. 
 
 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations (N=2,276) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1)TRANS1 1 0.481*** -0.023 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.051** 
(2)TRANS2  1 0.040* 0.119*** 0.086*** 0.016 
(3)IFRS   1 0.088*** -0.038* -0.067*** 
(4)AQ    1 0.166*** -0.062*** 
(5)SIZE     1 0.303*** 
(6)LEV      1 
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1)TRANS1 0.018 0.188*** -0.097*** 0.020 -0.033 0.001 
(2)TRANS2 0.018 0.378*** -0.163*** 0.061*** -0.033 0.047** 
(3)IFRS 0.119*** 0.033 -0.076*** -0.018 -0.002 -0.027 
(4)AQ -0.123*** 0.072*** -0.017 0.084*** 0.09***1 0.099*** 
(5)SIZE -0.125*** 0.055*** 0.139*** 0.442*** -0.050*** 0.451*** 
(6)LEV 0.312*** 0.033 0.047*** -0.129*** -0.108*** 0.056*** 
(7)LOSSDUM 1 0.099*** -0.071*** -0.155*** -0.101*** -0.116*** 
(8)AGE  1 -0.167*** -0.034 -0.135*** -0.058*** 
(9)GRW   1 0.050** 0.041* 0.068*** 
(10)FOR    1 -0.184*** 0.256*** 
(11)OWN     1 0.060*** 
(12)BIG4      1 
1) See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively. 
 
 
4.3 Results 
 
In Table 5, coefficients of IFRS are 0.124 for TRANS1 and 0.107 for TRANS2, which are significantly positive as 
expected, thus supporting our hypothesis that the adoption of IFRS enhances earnings transparency in Korea. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of an independent variable is 3.139 less than 10, which means there is not a serious 
multicollinearity problem. 
 
Our result implies that adopting IFRS contributes to higher level of earnings transparency in helping market 
participants make decisions, playing an important role in reducing information asymmetry.  
 
AQ and AGE are significant at 5% and 1% respectively as expected. The coefficient of GRW is significantly negative 
at 1% as expected. 𝑅0	ranges approximately from 18% to 30%. The F statistic is significant, suggesting that our use 
of the regression model is appropriate. 
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Table 5. Adoption of IFRS and earnings transparency (H) 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆&' = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽-𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆&'	 + 𝛽0𝐴𝑄&' + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸&' + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉&' + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑈𝑀&' + 𝛽=𝐴𝐺𝐸&' + 𝛽?𝐺𝑅𝑊&' + 𝛽A𝐹𝑂𝑅&' +𝛽B𝑂𝑊𝑁&' + 𝛽-+𝐵𝐼𝐺4&' + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝐷 + 𝜀&' (1) 
Variables Exp. Sign Dependent Variable TRANS1 Dependent Variable TRANS2 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  0.051  0.600 -1.439 -5.490*** 
IFRS (+) 0.124  9.280*** 0.107 2.620*** 
AQ (+) 0.139  1.970** 0.847 3.940*** 
SIZE (+) 0.005  1.360 0.013 1.280 
LEV (-) 0.029  1.220 0.048 0.650 
LOSSDUM (-) 0.004  0.380 -0.014 -0.460 
AGE (+) 0.041 8.840*** 0.254 18.050*** 
GRW (-) -0.024 -4.730*** -0.088 -5.600*** 
FOR (+) 0.025 0.750 0.202 2.020** 
OWN (+) 0.001 0.020 0.123 1.640 
BIG4 (+) 0.001 0.020 0.060 2.100** 
YD  YES YES YES YES 
ID  YES YES YES YES 
F-VALUE  35.77*** 18.45*** 
ADJ R-SQ  29.97% 17.68% 
1) See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Korea has adopted IFRS to make the firm's information environment to be more transparent. When firms’ financial 
statements, including its earnings, are more transparent, then the uncertainty about value of firm and information 
asymmetry will decline. We test whether adopting IFRS mandatorily improves earnings transparency for Korean 
firms. We measure earnings transparency based on Barth, et al. (2013) and Cheng and Subramanyam (2008). 
 
Using a sample of 2,276 from 2008 to 2014, we find that adopting IFRS increases earnings transparency. This implies 
IFRS mitigates information asymmetry, enhancing earnings transparency.  
 
We show that adopting IFRS and reporting transparent earnings in financial statements are very important in reducing 
information asymmetry in capital market, which helps market participants make decisions. 
 
Our paper suffers from an endogeneity issue due to omitted market variables such as volatility and abnormal returns. 
They should be incorporated in future studies because companies may attempt to make the information environment 
opaque to avoid adverse reaction from the capital market. Operation complexity variables such as foreign sales and 
the number of segments are also omitted although they are closely related to information uncertainty. Since private 
firms in Korea are not required to adopt IFRS, use of private firms as control samples in future may help sharpen the 
research design and interpret the role of IFRS on the observed results.  
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